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ABSTRACT
I examine the impact of IMF credit use and its conditions on economic growth performance in 12
South African countries over a period of 1999-2019. The work adopts an empirical and
quantitative approach to analyzing the relationship between the GDP per Capita, the use of IMF
Credit, Government Final Consumption Expenditure, Net Domestic Credit and Current Account
balance. These variables are the most recommended in the IMF conditionalities during the
lending arrangements with SADC members.
The study uses Fixed-effect approach to evaluate how the use of IMF program and the conditions
imposed directly affects economic growth. A dummy variable is included to evaluate GDP
growth if a country met or not the imposed condition. The result from the analyses concludes
that overall, the use of IMF credit has no statistical significance on the economic growth. But
when some conditions are met, the GDP responds positively. Other variables current account,
government expenditure, and net domestic shows significant and positive change on the GDP
growth of SADC countries.

Keywords: IMF, IMF credit usage, Economic growth, conditionality, compliance
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CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1Background of the study
The IMF loan programs has been more popular in recent decades. More nations, mainly
developing countries, have been participating in the loan program. As the participation in IMF
programs has greatly expanded, there has been a vigorous debate about the efficacy of such
participation in achieving the desired economic outcomes. One of the most asked question
regarding IMF loan and economic growth is if countries truly benefit from access to IMF loan
programs or would it be better if these programs did not exist?
In theory, the IMF program should promote economic growth both directly and indirectly, for
several reasons. First, IMF loans has inflexible conditions attached to them, for instance,
implementing fiscal austerity or changing the monetary policy. The disbursement of IMF funds
only take place if the borrowing country agree to the conditions imposed. Following IMF’s
advice and accepting the conditionality should have similar effects: improved policy making and
higher growth in the future, which leads them to increase their consumption, thus boost the
growth. Further, the IMF gives policy advice during economic crises. This advice should help
improve the economic climate and thus foster growth in the future. Finally, the loan from IMF
helps alleviate financial constraints that the borrowing countries face and should stimulate their
economies. In this research, the focus is to determine the effects of IMF’s lending and
conditionalities and evaluate the met conditions on poverty reduction and growth facilities
program for SADC countries’ economic growth while also considering the role and influences of
major variable in their conditionalities.
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1.2 Research question
This research aims at finding answers to the following questions:
I.
II.

Do the IMF loans influence economic growth in developing countries?
Do the policies or conditions imposed on IMF loans influence the economic growth of
the borrowing countries?

1.3 Objectives of the Study
The major objective of this study is to empirically test if the IMF loans and its imposed
conditions have favorable or non-favorable impact on the economic growth of SADC countries.
This research will need to look at the channels through which these IMF loans and conditions are
spent, whether these channels are drivers to growth of the economy. If the result of this study
establishes that the funds program has had a positive impact on the growth of the economy, then
I will further suggest more ways to enhance the efficiency of the Program. However, if the
findings of this research assert unfavorable relationship between the fund and the drivers of
growth, then I will further look at the reasons for this negative effect. It is hoped that the results
of this work could be used by the policymakers of SADC countries on programs that will
enhance their objectives of borrowing and committing to IMF loan conditions.
1.4 Hypothesis
The hypothesis to be tested for this study are:
H0: IMF loans impact the GDP in SADC countries
H1: IMF loans do not impact the GDP in SADC countries
H0: The conditions imposed by IMF impact the growth of GDP in SADC countries
H1: The conditions imposed by IMF does not affect the growth of GDP in SADC countries
7

1.5 Justification and Scope of the study
Over the years the IMF has come under strong criticism and attack. With some even arguing that
the IMF takes away the freedom and of the developing countries through its lending programs.
Some has alleged that the lending and conditionalities is a ‘bait’ towards the trapping to an
unending stream of national debt.
Although there are numerous research done on developing countries, usually the researched
countries lack strong similarities on social and economic situation. Therefore, taking inspiration
from Dreher (2004) and Barro and Lee (2003), this research on the IMF and its relationship will
focus solely on southern regions of Africa with countries that share similar social and economic
system. This study will contribute to the already existing research of IMF and growth, but it will
make a greater impact on the SADC countries because there is still shortage of research of the
IMF programs that focus solely on the economic conditions of this region.
1.6 Organization of the Study
The study is composed of four sections. Chapter one introduces the background to the study. The
chapter two gives an overview about SADC countries and IMF and the relationship between
both. Chapter three presents previous literatures on the studies of IMF lending conditionality and
hypotheses. Chapter four discusses the methodology, the result of the empirical analysis
summarizes the findings and concludes
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CHAPTER TWO
2.0 Overview of IMF and SADC Countries
2.1 IMF History and Structure
The IMF and the World Bank established in 1945, are products of the Bretton Wood conference
which was planned by the USA and The Great Britain with the aim to establish an International
monetary system with paper currencies as its base. The US dollar served as the anchor of the
system, whiles the gold remains its source of value. With a membership of 190 countries, its
initial role was to aid member countries that have exhausted their foreign exchange reserve and
have trade deficit. The IMF serves as a lender of last resort to countries who are unable to
borrow from the external financial markets when the country is facing difficulties with its
external payments. The highest unit governing body is the Board of Governors. They are the
highest decision-making body of the IMF (IMF, 1993). They are made of one governor and one
alternate governor representing each member country. The governor is usually the minister of
finance or can be the head of the central bank and is appointed by the member countries. The
Figure 3 in appendix indicates the structure of the IMF. Voting process by the Board of
Governors is done by Mail-in-ballot. The duties of the board of Governors consist of appointing
executive directors, approval of quota increases for members’ countries, admit new members,
allocates Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and take care of the amendments of by-laws and
articles of agreements (IMF, 2013).
2.2 Quotas and SDR
The IMF is a quota-based institution. Quotas are the financial and governance pillar of the IMF.
For the IMF to effectively carry out its mandate each member contributes a deposit called
“quota”; the amount of quota a country contributes shows its size in the world economy. The
9

initial determinant for a country’s loan size is its quota contribution. Also, the quota determines
the maximum amount of financial resources a country is obliged to contribute. Furthermore, the
quota contribution is the key determinant for the voting power in IMF decisions. The higher the
quota, the more power. According to IMF (1993), Votes comprises SDR 100,000 of quota plus
basic votes (same for all members). Finally, quota determines a member’s share of general
allocation of SDR.
The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) which is an international reserve asset that function as IMF
unit of account (IMF, 2020), determines the quotas. SDR is not a currency nor a country’s claim
on the IMF, but it is a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of the IMF members. The
currencies are the US Dollars, Euro, Chinese Yuan, Japanese Yen, and Pound sterling. The
determination of the SDR Value in terms of the US dollars is done on daily basis, according to
the spot exchange rates observed around London noon time (IMF, 2018). The SDRs are allocated
in two different forms: General and Special. In 2009, countries who joined the IMF after 1981
had a Special one-time allocation, after previous allocation was made on in the SDR system on
equitable basis. The SDR operates in a form self-financing mechanism and levies charges on
allocations which are then used to pay interest on SDR holdings. SDR can be traded by members
in the voluntary market. Moreover, based on requirements the IMF can also designate members
to buy SDRs.
2.3 IMF Lending and Programs Design
The IMF lends through a series of concessional and non-concessional arrangements.
Concessional arrangements are loans that pays rates similar to the market loans while nonconcessional borrowing is defined as loans that offers more generous terms than market loans.
(Ames et al, 2001). The IMF has an Executive Board in every member country. Through them, a
10

lending arrangement, which works like a line of credit is approved to support a country’s
adjustment program. The arrangement demands that the recipient country should observe
specific terms, which are subject to periodic reviews to continue to draw upon it.
Furthermore, the recipient country has the responsibility of selecting, designing, and
implementing policies to make the IMF-supported program successful. According to IMF
department of Finance, the program is described in a letter of intent, which often has a
memorandum of economic and financial policies attached (2017). The program’s objectives and
policies depend on a country’s prevailing circumstances. But the most important goal is to
restore, maintain and correct the Balance of payments viability and macroeconomic stability.
The IMF’s program design comprises different types of arrangements or loan, depending on the
borrowing country needs. For the scope of this study, the focus lays on Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) which is the most used programs on developing countries. The PRGF
program was founded in September 1999 with the objectives of making poverty reduction efforts
on low-income members of the IMF. Through PRGF, IMF adopted principles to promote the full
use of external aid while maintaining macroeconomic and debt sustainability
The PRGT program includes the following arrangements: Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Rapid
Credit Facility (RCF), and the Stand-by arrangement (SBA). The ECF was created to make the
Fund’s financial support more flexible and better tailored to the diverse needs of the low-income
countries, including in times of crisis (Lane and Phillips, 2002). The ECF is the IMF’s main
vehicle for giving medium-term support to low-income countries with Balance of payments
problems. The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) is given to members experiencing urgent balance of
payments need. The fund support under RCF carries zero interest rate and limited conditionality.
The Stand-By arrangement (SBA) unlike ECF is an arrangement used by middle income
11

countries as well. It responds quickly to members’ external financing needs and support policies
that help borrowing country to recover from crisis and restore sustainable growth.
2.4 IMF Conditions and Reviews
There are conditions which covers the design of IMF-supported programs, they are mostly
macroeconomic, structural, fiscal and monetary policies (Dreher, 2004). Performance in these
areas serves as the specific tools which are used to monitor the progress of the recipient countries
toward the goals outlined in the cooperation with the IMF Executive board. Moreover, the
conditionalities help borrower countries to solve their Balance of Payments problems without
needing to resort to ways and policies that are harmful to the nation both domestically and
internationally. At the same time, the measures are meant to serve as a form of insurance for the
IMF, by ensuring that the imposed conditions on the borrowing country will be favorable enough
for them to repay the loan and its interest by the due date (Joyce, 2004).
The IMF uses three main tools to review, assess, and monitor borrowers’ compliance. The
Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPCs) is a tool that relates to macroeconomic variables such
as fiscal balances, external borrowing, international reserves, and monetary and credit
aggregates. Through this assessment, IMF review if the borrower met the minimum level of
federal government primary balance, the minimum level of international and ceiling on
government borrowing. The Indicative targets (ITs) tool is also set to track quantitative
indicators as QPCs, however, the ITs works better in capturing results on the face of uncertainty
about economic trends. ITs monitor performance of borrowers’ commitment in meeting the
minimum domestic revenue collection and level of social assistance spending. Last, the
Structural Benchmarks (SBs) which performs a different role as the other tools. SBs are nonquantifiable tool that measures borrowers’ economic reforms. The SBs focuses on measuring if
12

the country is improving financial sector operations, building up social safety nets, and/or
strengthening public financial management.
2.5 SADC creation and Political History
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is an economic block comprised of 16 South
African countries founded in 1992. However, SADC originated in the 1960s and 1970s under the
name of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in Lusaka with only
nine countries members. SADC primary objective is the integration of economic development
among southern African nations. This development achievement pan consists of reduction of
members state dependence, mobilization of the members’ resources to promote the
implementation of national, regional, and interstate policies, to establish relation to create
genuine and equitable regional integration, and finally action to secure international cooperation
within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation (SADC website).
Figure:1 SADC region on the map and its respective countries.
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2.6 SADC and Poverty Reduction and Growth
SADC countries have been experiencing positive population growth over the last three decades
(Table 5, appendix). Growth in population implies that economies must grow rapidly to generate
new employments at level that satisfy the need of the population and to reduce poverty. But the
economy of SADC countries fails to follow the population growth pace which has been resulting
in extreme poverty.
According to Mapuva et al (2014), the poverty level in southern Africa continues to increase;
about half of the population is living on less than $1 a day. In the hope to reduce the poverty
level, these countries use IMF funding programs as resource, however, the result from the fund
are not reflected on the economy.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 IMF and Economic Growth
The IMF’s main goals is to promote growth. As the IMF former managing director Michel
Camdessus, said in his statement at the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Geneva,
on July 11, 1990: “Our primary objective is growth. In my view, there is no ambiguity about this.
It is toward growth that our programs and their conditionality are aimed”. This statement
reinforces the objective of IMF, which is economic growth. But over the years studies have
shown opposite results compared to the primary goal of IMF.
Economic growth can be defined simply as Economic expansion. The IMF’s Social Dimensions
of the IMF’s Policy dialogue (1995), defines Economic growth has that “which brings lasting
employment gains and poverty reduction, provides greater equality of income through greater
equality of opportunity, including for women, and respects human freedom and protects the
environment.” According to the IMF’s Policy Dialogue, growth is achieved on the following
foundations: Macroeconomic policy, Social policy, Structural policy; and Good governance and
Participatory Development. For the scope of this research, however, the focus is only in one
aspect of the three Pillars of Economic growth as according to the IMF, which is the
Macroeconomic Policy.
3.1.1 The Negative impact of IMF lending on GDP growth
The weight of evidence on the relationship between IMF loans and economic growth, has
suggested more negative effect than positive. Barro and Lee (2003) studied the relationship
between IMF loan and GDP growth for developing countries. The study was conducted using
panel data for the period 1975 to 2000 using VAR approach. The results showed that higher IMF
15

loan participation rate reduces economic growth. In addition, the involvement in IMF loan
programs decreases the investment level of the borrowing country and tends to lower the rule of
law and democracy. They concluded that a country is better off economically without
committing to be involved with IMF loans program. Dreher (2004) also established that the IMF
programs were designed to enhanced growth, but they achieve the opposite. In his study using
panel data for 98 countries, he found that IMF programs decrease growth rate when the
endogeneity is accounted for further, weak evidence shows that compliance with the IMF
conditionalities reduce this negative effect. Connors (1979) and Gylfason (1987) had also
reported the same result of no economic growth impacted by the IMF loan.
3.1.2 The positive impact of IMF lending on GDP growth
Positive results were reported by Hackler et all (2018). In this study the authors used 93
developing countries to analyze the direct effect of IMF loan condition compliance on GDP
growth. The researchers selected a list of conditions imposed by the IMF for loan arrangements
and used countries as the dummy variable to examine how compliance on conditions directly
affects GDP growth. By using OLS method, the results suggests that real GPD growth rates are
directly affected by the IMF loan when the imposed conditions are met. Conway (1994)
reassessed the relationship between economic growth and IMF program by examining the
performance of three macroeconomic measures: the real GDP per capita, fiscal surplus GDP, and
current account. The estimation technique employed in the research included instrumentalvariable, and matching. The result from the panel data of 95 developing countries suggest that
current account and fiscal surplus improve economic growth with IMF participation.
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3.2 IMF and Poverty
Poverty is an issue that numerous scholars continue to research because it is a phenomenon that
represent challenges to eradicate. The World Development Report has defined Poverty as an
unacceptable impoverishment and penury in human well-being that consist of both social and
physiological deprivation. Poverty is a challenge that goes beyond economics, it also includes
some other aspects of cultural, political, and social issues. In terms of physiological deprivation,
it includes the lack of the basic material or biological needs, including improper education,
inadequate health and nutrition, and lack of shelter.
3.3 IMF and developing Countries
The IMF constantly suffers heavy criticism about its programs with developing countries. Over
decades several developing nations had been receiving loan from the IMF in the hope of
reducing poverty rate and experience economic growth; however, the reality had been far from
what IMF says is its objective, economic growth. Bird and Mosley (2004) made some important
remarks concerning the IMF and the Developing countries in their book. Most of the remarks
were from the report of the Meltzer Commission (the International Financial Institution Advisory
Commission at the US Congress, 2000). According to Bird and Mosley (2004), Events and
reforms have led the IMF into dealing with problems such as Poverty reduction and growth
which they were not originally aiming at. Bird and Mosley further explains that the IMF through
their conditional lending arrangement gives too little for the local and recipient country room to
make credible and judicious long-term decisions on growth and Poverty reduction. Jonathan
Sonnenberg (2018), in his famous article make 15 some important criticisms about how the IMF
programs like the Poverty Reduction and Growth Fund and the HIPC has landed some African
countries into a debt cycle. Sonnenberg (2018) makes a damning claim that the HIPC imitative
of the Bretton Wood twins has contributed to an “extortive trend of debt-cycling”.
17

The IMF is mainly focused on making the conditions favorable for itself in the immediate
medium term to regain its loans and the repayments. All the conditions are merely insurance
cover for their lending and not as growth and poverty alleviation instruments as claimed.
According to Meltzer commission, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) should be
abandoned, and the IMF should rather focus on short-term crisis lending, for instance, the
lending instrument given out during the Covid-19 crisis in the early quarters of the year 2020.
Once more, the Meltzer Commission made some suggestions that the current conditionalities
should be replaced by rather Fiscal and Financial requirements observed over some period of
years. The IMF should focus on rather exchange rate policies, financial sector surveillance and
monetary policies. According to Bird and Mosley (2004), the IMF should refrain from the Socalled structural adjustment conditionalities. Because of the conditionalities involved in the
lending by the IMF, moral hazards are likely to happen, causing the innocent citizen of the
recipient country to feel the effect. Hence, the aim of Poverty alleviation “backfires”, leading to a
opposite effect.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 Methodology
4.1 Sample and Data
The study uses a sample of 12 countries with annual data covering the period from 1999 to 2019.
Although SADC has 16 countries members, this research excludes four countries. South Africa
is an outlier within SADC due to its economic development discrepancy compared to the rest of
the members countries. The other three countries (Namibia, Seychelles, Mauritius) have data
limitation. The dependent variable used in this study is the rate of GDP growth per capita. The
Use of IMF credit as the main independent variable, and other explanatory variables include
Current account balance as a percentage of GDP, Net Domestic credit, in place of Fiscal
policy discipline, I used General Government final consumption expenditure as percent of
GDP, Total investment as percent of GDP, and Average of governance indicators. The
source of data used in this research are from the World Bank Development Indicator (WDI, 22),
the World Economic Outlook, and the IMF annual Reports. The selected countries for this study
are presented in the appendix, table 4.
To fully measure the impact of the fund and the conditions on the borrowing country, the
Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) was used. As explained on the IMF website, the
MONA database contains comparable information on the economic objectives and outcomes in
Fund-supported arrangements. It tracks the performance of countries in terms of scheduled
purchases and reviews, quantitative and structural conditionality, and macroeconomic indicators.
Data are available for most arrangements since 2002 to the present, and are collected at the time
of arrangement approval, and following each review.
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4.2 Variable Description


GDP per capita

GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by the country’s population. GDP per capita
properly captures the true value of prosperity in a country, and it is commonly used as a proxy of
the initial conditions of a country in terms of development. This variable is used as dependent
variable to capture the change in economic development over the years.


IMF Credit Usage (IMF credit)

Use of IMF Credit data is related to the operations of the IMF and provided by the IMF
Treasurer’s Department. They are converted from special drawing rights into dollars using endof-period exchange rates for stocks and average-over-the-period exchange rates for flows. The
IMF credit usage is the right choice for this research because all its policy programs require
ceilings on domestic credit creation and public spending (Bird 1998: 94). Relative to the World
Bank, where noncompliance with conditionality normally takes years to monitor, the Fund’s
conditions can be monitored after very few lags, this makes it easier to document
noncompliance. (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1998: 68). The Use of IMF credit was originally in
nominal terms, hence the 𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝑰𝑴𝑭credit, was estimated to arrive at the real value of the
𝑰𝑴𝑭credit. The arguments surrounding the impact of IMF credit usage on GDP is complex and
several studies came up with different conclusion.


Net Domestic Credit (NDC)

According to World Bank World Development Index 2020, Net domestic credit is the sum of net
claims on the central government and claims on other sectors of the domestic economy (IFS line
32). It is the total sum of net credit given to the non-financial public sector, and credits offered to
20

the private sector, together with other accounts. Countries with high debt are likely to not benefit
from the IMF fund’s credit usage.


Government Expenditure (GE)

GE (% of GDP) represents government general expenditures; it includes all current expenditures
for goods and services (compensation of employees, national defense, and security). The effect
of GE on economic growth is ambiguous because its outcome depends on many factors and the
economic situation at a given time. This variable is important in the process of IMF loans
arrangements because it assess spending level of borrowing countries.


Current Account (CA)

IMF defines the Current account as that which shows the flow of goods, services, primary
income, secondary income between residents and non-residents. It is one of the main features of
the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics.


Total Investment (TI)

The collected data was the gross capital formation which also known as Investment. It includes
capital expenditures in machinery and equipment dwellings, change in stocks and valuables
(gold). Investment is believed to be one of the most important type of capital movement because
it stimulates additional investment, which result in increase in GDP.


Governance Indicators (AvgGI)

The governance indicators is composed of six dimensions of governance used to measure the
quality of a nation’s government. The six dimensions are rule of law, political stability,
government effectiveness, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, control of corruption.
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Each one these indicators, if managed well, promotes development. For the scope of this paper, I
averaged each indicator over the period of 1999-2018 and measured the relationship with GDP
growth.
4.3 Model Specification
The models used on this research are specified as follow:
Model 1: Effect of IMF credit Use in GDP growth:
GDPper capitait = 0 + 1 LnIMFcreditit + 2 NDCit + 3 LnGEit + 4 CAit + 5 LnInvit + 6
AvgGIit + it
Model 2: Effect of IMF Conditions in GDP growth:
GDPper capitait = 0 + 1 LnIMFcreditit + 2 Xit + 3Programit + 4 Met conditionXit+ it
The first model is specified to capture the contemporaneous effect of IMF credit use on
economic growth. The model 2 is an expanded formula of model 1. Assessing the performance
of program countries without discriminating among them by their degree of compliance could
give a misleading view of the effects of the IMF programs
Therefore, the second model is focusing on direct impact of IMF conditions on GDP growth by
looking at specific IMF program and the countries that have met IMF conditions imposed on this
program. The B2Xt is a Vector of variables controlling for development which includes CA,
NDC, Investment, and GE. I use two dummy variables; one specifies met conditions and the
other the program type. Although IMF has numerous programs, this study is limited on the
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) program because it is the most used program among
SADC countries. The dummies are specified 1 if the country used PRGF program and 1 if met
the conditions, otherwise it is zero.
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The IMF conditions included in this model are the following:
1) Fiscal deficit (FD): the limit imposed on fiscal deficit of a country
2) Balance of Payment (BoP): controlling medium and long-term debt to international
creditors
3) Ceiling on External arrears (CEA): controlling overdue debts and payments to
domestic creditors
4.3 Estimation Strategy
The data used in this model consist of several cross-sectional values surveyed over time. This is
also known as panel or longitudinal data. Panel data is considered to have more advantages than
time series or cross-sectional data because it provides more information, efficiency, and
variability. The appropriate estimation techniques for panel model are fixed and random effects,
and pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS).
The pooled OLS is the less complex method because it assumes that all the entities (countries)
are the same and pools them together disregarding heterogeneities. This method has high risk of
providing spurious regression results. However, Fixed Effect (EF) and Random Effect (RE)
methods account for heterogeneities among entities being analyzed. Fixed effect approach takes
into consideration the differences between individual entities and if the omitted variables are
correlated. It is a preferred approach when analyzing the impact of variables that very over time.
On the other hand, Random effect approach is preferred when variables on the model are
constant over time.
To determine whether to use Fixed Effect or Random Effect, the Hausman test was performed.
The hausman test looks to see if there is a correlation between errors terms and the regressors in
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the model. The null hypothesis states that there is no correlation. The results from the test reject
the null hypothesis; thus, the Fixed Effect is the appropriate approach for these models.
Table 3: Hausman Test
Model
P-value
Direct IMF credit use
0.0127
IMF Conditions
0.0398
4.4 Results and Discussion
The results presented on table 2 explains the impact of the selected independent variables on
GDP growth per capita.
Table 2: Fixed-Effect results for IMF credit use
Variables
LnIMFcredit
NDC
LnGE
CA
LnInv
AvgGI
Constant
Observations
R2
Number of countries

Coefficient (SE)
0.022
(.312)
-1.581
(9.381) *
2.749
(0.923) **
0.125
(0.035) ***
4.209
(0.852) ***
0.244
(1.575)
-18.448
(6.474)
252
0.647
12

Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
The result shows no evidence of economic growth resulting from the use of IMF credit. For the
scope of this study, it can be concluded that contemporaneous effect of IMF credit use is
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insignificant on SADC countries’ GDP growth per capita. This result corroborates with
Hutchison (2004) and Hardoy (2002). The insignificant result can be related to the fact that
SADC countries typically enter into an agreement with the IMF only when facing terrible
economic problems. One of the biggest criticisms on IMF is that it usually does not focus on the
countries’ governance quality before making loan arrangements. The lack of understanding in
the overall governance system of the borrowing country can result in the misallocation of the
funding.
As can be seen, most explanatory variables have the expected sign. Net domestic credit has a
negative relationship with GDP growth. As domestic credit increases by 1%, the economy of
SADC countries decreases by 1.58%. This result was expected because southern African
countries lack a stable financial system. Evans (2013) study argues that one of the major’s
implication in Africa’s economic growth is an inefficient financial system. The foundations for
building sustained economic growth in SADC countries depends on the type of financial system.
Considering institutional constraints, regulations, and other macro-economic factors working
against domestic credit in the economy, SADC policymakers should make the environment
conducive and supportive so that performance is enhanced, and good lending behavior is
guaranteed.
The increase in government expenditure leads to economic growth of 2.749%. This result is
consistent with Barro (1999) who claims that the impact of government expenditure on economic
growth is positive for the growing economies. SADC countries are developing economies, which
means they are still in growth phase of economic life cycle. It is believed that increasing
government expenditure is one of the ways the government can stimulate the economy. Thus,
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increasing government spending through education, health care, and infrastructure is crucial for a
string economy.
Current account shows a strong positive relationship with GDP per capita. The significance level
is 1% and goes in line with the expected results. As current account increases by 1%, the
economy grows 0.125%. Although the magnitude of the increase is low, the current account and
GDP is expected to move in the same direction.
Total investment also shows a strong positive relationship with GDP per capita. The significance
level of these two variables is 1% and goes in line with the expected results. An increase of 1%
in total investment leads to 4.209% in economy growth. Several empirical studies have proven
positive relationship between Investment and economic growth. Therefore, I expected a
significant and positive results. High investment leads to an expansion of economic growth. By
including property rights, it becomes possible for society to meet a higher productivity trading
relationship and to enjoy the benefits of voluntary exchange (Grossman, 1988).
The result on the relationship between the average of governance indicators and the GDP growth
is quite surprising because it would be expected either a positive or negative relationship
between these variables. However, what is not surprising is that southern African countries have
low quality of governance. The lack of significance between these variables could be explained
by what Vaubel (1983) refers to as “moral hazard hypothesis”. The idea behind this hypothesis is
that the availability of IMF lending programs may be a boost for countries to deteriorate their
economic policies to be eligible for more funds from the IMF. In the last two decades SADC
countries, especially Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola, have been granted large sum of IMF
funds but the quality of governance continues to deteriorate. Dreher (2005) argues that it is
evident that the balance of payments problems of IMF borrowers has been caused by their own
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and their macroeconomic performance has been deteriorating as the number of IMF loan
programs increases.
Table 3: Model 2- Fixed-Effect results for IMF Conditions
Variables
LnIMFc
NDC
LnGE
CA
LnInv
FD
BoP
CEA
PRGF
Constant

Coefficient (SE)
0.0129
(0.315)
-1.371
(9.851)
2.587
(0.927) **
0.126
(0.034) ***
4.186
(0.851) ***
-1.414
(0.638) *
-0.087
(0.369)
-0.449
(0.409)
0.629
(0.756)
-18.119
(6.392) **
79
0.360
9

Observations
R2
Number of
countries
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

The results from variables used on the model 1 are similar with the second model, except the net
domestic credit that came out insignificant.
Limit on Fiscal deficit is the only met condition while the conditions on Balance of Payment and
Ceilings on External Arrears are insignificant. The loan program countries meeting the condition
for Fiscal Deficit experienced a decrease in real GDP growth rates. The results suggest, with
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90% confidence, that the fiscal deficit condition decreases a country’s real GDP growth rates by
an average of 1.414%. According to Bird and Mosley (2004), the Fund’s conditionalities are
ineffective. They argue that IMF uses the conditionalities and arrangements to exert to much
coercion on the developing countries. This is in sync with Sonnenberg (2018) accusations. Bird
and Mosley further explains that the IMF through their conditional lending arrangement gives
too little for the local and recipient country room to make credible and judicious long-term
decisions on growth and Poverty reduction. The IMF is only focused on making the conditions
favorable for itself in the immediate medium term to regain it loans and the repayments
Killick (1995) also gives evidence that highly indebted countries as well as countries with small
amounts of IMF credit are less likely to complete a program and that fiscal conditions are
especially unlikely to be met. He also stresses that new programs are approved for political
reasons even if non-compliance with conditionality of previous ones is evident.
2.0 Conclusion and Limitations
The objective of this paper was to estimate the effect of the IMF lending on the economy of
SADC countries. Together with this objective, was to also estimate the effect of most of the
macroeconomic variables which matter in the IMF conditionalities in the lending out of the loan
to these countries. Two fixed-effect models were applied to examine this relationship. A panel
data for 12 countries from 1999 to 2019 were used in this study.
As has been shown in several studies, with respect to this objective, IMF programs are a failure.
The results attained from this research determines no significant effect on economic growth
caused by IMF credit use. The results also showed that the condition imposed by the IMF
program are insignificant, besides the fiscal deficit that showed low but significant impact on
GDP growth of SADC countries.
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This results from this study supports Hutchison (2004), Hardoy (2002) and many other research
that the IMF is only focused on making the conditions favorable for itself in the immediate
medium term to regain it loans and the repayments. From this results, policymakers of SADC
should be more aware of the conditions imposed by the IMF during program loan arrangements.
Every research work has its limitations. One of the challenges of this work was data availability.
There was no data for three countries. In addition, the countries in this dataset likely have very
different production structures and most IMF relief recipients in developing regions tend to have
less accurate valuations of GDP relative to developed countries. Further, it is important to note
that this research did not consider the lag of GDP. Therefore, some alterations could be made to
the data to be able to draw more precise conclusions. Future research should investigate whether
SADC countries experience economic growth over time because of IMF program.
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Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 1999-2019 (Full Sample)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Mean
Standard
Minimum
Maximum
deviation
1.78
4.20
-18.49
18.06
364
389
10253
1860
1360
3650
-168
23600
21.74
11.68
2.04
60.37
-4.40
10.59
-57.96
22.19
23.19
10.56
1.53
53.98
-0.61
0.61
-2.10
0.89

Variable
GDPPC
IMFcredit
NDC
GE
CA
INV
GI

(5)
Observation
252
252
252
252
252
252
252

Table 5: Socio-Demographic- Population in SADC (2009-2019)
SADC
Member
States
Angola
Botswana
Comoros
DRC
Eswatini
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
SADC Total

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

22,099
1,951
669
70 391
1 044
1 887
19 601
13 520
1 247
21 803
2 103
87
50 545
41 916
12 626
12 231
273,720

22,802
1,988
687
72 884
1 055
1 892
20 142
13 948
1 250
22 417
2 143
88
51 329
43 187
13 093
12 336
281,241

23,533
2,025
705
75 259
1 067
1 897
20 696
14 389
1 252
23 050
2 116
87
52 129
44 485
13 719
12 754
289,163

24,292
2,063
724
77 817
1 080
1 901
21 263
14 845
1 256
23 701
2 155
87
52 930
44 929
14 145
13 062
296,251

25,080
2,101
744
80 462
1 093
1 908
21 842
15 317
1 259
24 366
2 196
89
53 751
46 356
14 600
13 368
304,532

25,901
2 156
764
83 197
1 106
1 916
22 434
15 805
1 261
25 042
2 238
91
54 574
47 831
15 023
13 652
312,992

26,681
2 195
785
85 026
1 119
1 924
23 040
16 311
1 263
25 728
2 281
93
55 407
49 359
15 934
13 944
320,630

27,503
2 230
806
86 895
1 132
1 942
23 658
16 833
1 263
26 424
2 459
95
56 253
50 942
16 405
14 240
328,608

28,359
2 155
828
88 806
1 093
1 953
24 290
17 373
1 265
27 864
2 369
96
57 098
52 555
15 474
14 745
337,254

29,250
2 303
851
91 724
1 120
2 183
25 680
17 564
1 265
28 586
2 414
97
5793
54 199
16 887
15 27
347,334

30,175
2,339
851
97,356
1,134
2,125
26,969
18,629
1,266
29,318
2,459
98
58,775
55,891
17,381
15,573
360,339

Source: SADC report website
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Table 6: Countries in the sample
Angola

Madagascar

Botswana

Malawi

Comoros

Mozambique

Republic Democratic of Congo

Tanzania

Eswatini

Zambia

Lesotho

Zimbabwe

Figure 2: IMF Organizational chart
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